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JURISDICTIONAL IDEALISM AND POSITIVISM
JOHN F. PREIS*
ABSTRACT
“If I should call a sheep’s tail a leg, how many legs would it have?
Four, because calling a tail a leg would not make it so.” This old
quip, often attributed to Abraham Lincoln, captures an issue at the
heart of the modern law of subject matter jurisdiction. Some believe
that there is a Platonic ideal of jurisdiction that cannot be changed
by judicial or legislative fiat. Others take a positivist approach and
assert that jurisdiction is nothing more than whatever a legislature
says it is. Who is right?
Neither and both. Although neither idealism nor positivism is the
best approach, a combination of both is. The law of jurisdiction in
the United States, like all positive law, is a human creation and thus
susceptible to modification by humans. If lawmakers want their
jurisdictional sheep to have five legs, they are free to declare the tail
a leg, and courts must heed that declaration. But lawmakers occa-
sionally speak ambiguously. When courts encounter ambiguity—like
a tail that may or may not be a leg—they should resolve the ambigu-
ity in a way that affirms, rather than contradicts, the ideal.
* Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. Special thanks to Jud Campbell,
Jessica Erickson, Kevin Walsh, Howard Wasserman, and participants at the Third Annual
Civil Procedure Workshop at University of Arizona School of Law for their thoughts on
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INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 2008, the Supreme Court gathered for oral
argument in Haywood v. Drown.1 A key issue in the case was
whether a particular statute was “jurisdictional,” that is, whether
it defined the jurisdiction of a court or rather provided substantive
law to apply after the court had obtained jurisdiction.2 About six
minutes into the argument, Chief Justice John Roberts suggested
that jurisdictionality can sometimes be discerned from the “look” of
the statute. As he put it:
[A]t some point something starts to look jurisdictional, which is,
look, we’re not going to hear your case at all. In other areas,
even if they call it jurisdictional, it really doesn’t seem that way,
such as, well, you’ve got to give this much notice or you’ve got to
— you know, maybe those things aren’t really jurisdictional. But
saying you can’t bring the case at all strikes me as really
jurisdictional.3
But then, a bit later in the argument, Justice Samuel Alito
suggested a different test for jurisdictionality: “Isn’t jurisdiction
whatever the legislature says it is? Do you think there is some sort
of—you know, a Platonic ideal of jurisdiction versus nonjurisdiction,
and that’s what we apply here?”4
These two statements frame a current debate over subject matter
jurisdiction in the federal courts. On one side are those we might
call the “jurisdictional idealists.” The idealists believe that there is
a “Platonic ideal” of jurisdiction such that some laws will “look jur-
isdictional” and others will not.5 The idealist view is reminiscent of
a quip often attributed to Abraham Lincoln: “If I should call a
sheep’s tail a leg, how many legs would it have? Four, because
calling a tail a leg would not make it so.”6 Idealists can tell the
1. 556 U.S. 729 (2009).
2. Id. at 734-37.
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Haywood, 556 U.S. 729 (No. 07-10374).
4. Id. at 20-21. 
5. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 621-22 (2017).
6. See George W. Julian, Lincoln and the Proclamation of Emancipation, in
REMINISCENCES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN BY DISTINGUISHED MEN OF HIS TIME 227, 242 (Allen
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difference between jurisdiction and nonjurisdiction, regardless of
what you call it.7
Illustrative of the idealist approach is a new and provocative
article by Professor Scott Dodson, a long-time scholar of federal
jurisdiction.8 In Dodson’s view, jurisdiction has an “inherent iden-
tity”9 that “[n]either Congress nor the courts can change.”10 The
essence of jurisdiction is that it “determines forum in a multiforum
legal system,” and thus Congress may not declare rules jurisdic-
tional if they do not pertain to forum.11 Dodson’s approach leads to
some surprising conclusions, such as the law of standing being non-
jurisdictional.12 Though we have long called standing jurisdiction-
al,13 Dodson’s article argues (as Lincoln might have) that calling it
jurisdictional does not make it so.14
In contrast to the idealists are those we might call the “juris-
dictional positivists.”15 The positivists believe that jurisdiction is
Thorndike Rice ed., Harper & Bros. new & rev. ed. 1909) (1886) (“[H]e used to liken the case
to that of the boy who, when asked how many legs his calf would have if he called its tail a leg,
replied, ‘Five,’ to which the prompt response was made that calling the tail a leg would not
make it a leg.”).
7. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 637.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 622.
10. Id. at 637. 
11. Id. at 621-22. Dodson does allow Congress to control the effects of the jurisdictional
label, such as whether jurisdiction is subject to equitable exceptions. See id. at 622, 646. 
12. Id. at 646-48. 
13. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998); United States
v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995).
14. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 647-48 (“But characterizing standing as jurisdictional
causes tensions with sister doctrines derived from Article III, including ‘prudential’ standing
(which some deem a nonjurisdictional creation of the courts), ripeness (which can, at times,
be waived by the parties), and mootness (which contains judicially created exceptions).”
(footnotes omitted)).
15. This use of the term “positivist” is likely to strike legal philosophers as incorrect. In
their world, “positive law” can issue from any legal institution (whether a legislature or other-
wise) that society recognizes as authoritative. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100 (2d
ed. 1994) (discussing the rule of recognition). Nonetheless, perhaps for ease of reference,
scholars studying the law of federal jurisdiction have adopted the “positivist” descriptor to
describe jurisdictional law created by the legislature (as opposed to the courts). See Dodson,
supra note 5, at 631-32 (using the term “positive law” to refer to legislatively created law);
Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1629 (2003)
(same); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 691-93 (2005)
(same). Thus, at the risk of annoying legal philosophers, but with the goal of addressing
current scholarship in this area, this Article uses the term “positive law” to refer only to law
enacted by Congress.
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“whatever the legislature says it is.”16 Congress has the power to
create the lower federal courts, and if it wants to define their juris-
diction in odd ways, it is free to do so—just as all of us are free to
call a tail a leg if it serves our purposes.17
The positivist approach is best illustrated by modern Supreme
Court jurisprudence. At present, the Court will deem a statute
jurisdictional if “Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ that the rule is jur-
isdictional”—regardless of whether the statute has an inherent
connection to forum.18 If Congress has not made such a statement,
however, “courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional
in character.”19 Scholars have generally lauded the Court’s positivist
stance,20 though Professor Erin Morrow Hawley has recently crit-
icized it as unnecessary.21
This Article critiques the idealist and positivist approaches.
Although idealism properly recognizes that there is a widely
shared understanding of jurisdiction,22 it fails to acknowledge the
congressional prerogative to depart from these widely shared
understandings if it desires.23 Today’s sheep, it is true, only have
16. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 20-21.
17. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973) (“Nor, if inferior federal courts
were created, was [Congress] required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was
authorized to bestow under Art. III.”); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850)
(“Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated
controversies [in Article III].”).
18. See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006)); see also Arbaugh v. Y
& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006) (“If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold
limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be
duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.” (footnote omitted)).
19. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516.
20. See, e.g., Stephen R. Brown, Hearing Congress’s Jurisdictional Speech: Giving
Meaning to the “Clearly-States” Test in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 33,
51-52 (2009); Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 66-67
(2008); Lee, supra note 15, at 1629, 1631; Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and
Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1548 (2008).
21. Erin Morrow Hawley, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution: Redefining the Meaning
of Jurisdiction, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2027, 2032 (2015) (“The Court is right to demand
precision as to jurisdiction. But the clear statement rule is a clumsy, distracting, and
ultimately unnecessary attempt to carry that mandate into effect.”). Professor Andy Hessick
has also criticized the clear statement rule. See F. Andrew Hessick III, The Common Law of
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 60 ALA. L. REV. 895, 926-29 (2009) (explaining why it is
“difficult to defend” the clear statement rule).
22. Dodson, supra note 5, at 621-22.
23. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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four legs, but the path of evolution may one day give them five. Our
Platonic ideal of a sheep, as with jurisdiction, can never be perma-
nent; it is always subject to change at the hands of a higher power.
The positivist approach is also flawed. Although it appropriately
recognizes Congress’s preeminent authority to define federal juris-
diction,24 it fails to account for the fact that “[j]urisdiction ... is a
word of many, too many, meanings.”25 Congress has used the word
in a multitude of ways and contexts, many of which are almost cer-
tainly nonjurisdictional.26 To declare that the word “jurisdiction”
will always render a statute jurisdictional is like Noah Webster
declaring that the word “bay” always refers to a body of water and
never refers to horse’s coloring.27 A dictionary writer’s job, much like
that of the Supreme Court’s, is to discern from the words spoken
what is truly meant, not to declare by fiat what they shall mean
henceforth.28
If neither idealism nor positivism is the answer, what is? In this
Article, I argue that the answer is idealism and positivism. Under
the combined approach I propose, a court would discern a statute’s
jurisdictionality by focusing on the statutory text (a positivist ap-
proach) in light of traditional conceptions of jurisdictionality (an
idealist approach). For example, if Congress uses the word “juris-
diction” to define the remedial powers of district courts (for example,
“district courts shall have jurisdiction to enjoin violations of this
Act”), courts should not automatically conclude that the statute is
jurisdictional simply because the j-word is present. Rather, courts
should do what the clear statement rule currently prohibits them
from doing: determine whether, in light of jurisdiction’s traditional
attributes, Congress was using the word in the traditional sense.29
Of course, the downside of this approach is that it might deny Con-
24. Lee, supra note 15, at 1629.
25. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States
v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
26. Cf. Dodson, supra note 5, at 657.
27. This example is borrowed from Justice Antonin Scalia. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 26 (1997). 
28. This criticism of positivism is not overcome by simply arguing that textualism is a
superior method of statutory interpretation, for textualists readily acknowledge that a word’s
meaning can and should be derived from context. Thus, as Justice Scalia explains, “If you tell
me, ‘I took the boat out on the bay,’ I understand ‘bay’ to mean one thing; if you tell me, ‘I put
the saddle on the bay,’ I understand it to mean something else.” Id.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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gress the opportunity to wield its jurisdictional powers in uncom-
mon ways. This is possible, but not only are these instances likely
to be rare, Congress can likely overcome this by making its jurisdic-
tional choices more explicit than usual. In this sense, the solution
to the current problem is not to abolish the clear statement rule, but
to reform it.
This Article unfolds as follows. Part I provides a brief explana-
tion of the current law, including the importance of the jurisdic-
tional label and how federal courts determine whether to affix it to
a particular statute. Part II presents the idealist and positivist
approaches and explains why neither approach, on its own, is suf-
ficient. Part III then offers a combined approach and explains why
that approach, when used with a modified clear statement rule, is
superior to the alternatives. Part III next applies that new approach
to an issue currently splitting the circuits. A short conclusion
follows.
I. THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION
Before one can assess the merits of jurisdictional idealism and
positivism, one must first understand how this question arises, the
stakes underlying it, and how the Supreme Court has answered it
in recent years. This Part does that by first explaining the question
of jurisdiction and its importance, and then explaining how the
Supreme Court currently answers the question.
A. The Question and Why It Matters
The following scenario arises frequently in federal courts: a plain-
tiff files a lawsuit and the defendant, at some point, points out a
defect in the suit. The appropriate judicial response to the defend-
ant’s argument will depend on the nature of the defect. For instance,
if the defect is substantive (for example, the plaintiff was contrib-
utorily negligent),30 the court will ordinarily dismiss the suit with
prejudice—but only if the defendant raised the defect at an appro-
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (permitting a party to respond to a pleading with affirmative
defenses).
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priate time and in an appropriate way.31 If the defendant failed to
do so, the court will usually ignore the defect and allow the suit to
proceed.32
If the defect is not substantive, it might be procedural—such as
the plaintiff’s failure to file a document by a particular deadline.33
When a defect is procedural, the court will usually impose some
consequences on the plaintiff but not dismiss the suit.34 Indeed, in
these situations, federal courts generally have discretion to forgive
such miscues altogether, provided the plaintiff has an innocent
explanation for the error.35 As with substantive defects, however, it
is important that the defendant raise it at the appropriate time and
in the appropriate manner. If the defendant fails to do this, he will
have waived his right to challenge it.36
If a defect is not substantive or procedural, it might be jurisdic-
tional. For instance, if the plaintiff is seeking relief solely under
state law but is a citizen of the same state as the defendant, the
federal court will probably lack subject matter jurisdiction.37 The
court’s treatment of jurisdictional defects, however, differs from its
treatment of other defects in four ways. First, the defendant can
raise the defect at any time during the litigation, even for the first
time on appeal. Thus, jurisdictional defects are never waived or
forfeited.38 Second, even if the defendant never raises the defect, the
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (requiring that “[e]very defense to a claim for relief in any
pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading”).
32. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) (specifying circumstances in which a defending party
will be deemed to waive an affirmative defense).
33. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (stating deadlines for disclosing materials during
discovery).
34. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1) (“If a party fails to provide information or identify a
witness as required by Rule 26(a) ..., the party is not allowed to use that information or
witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless.”).
35. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1) (permitting courts to relieve a party from the effect
of a judgment or order due to the party’s “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect”).
36. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4) (“Any ground not stated in a timely objection [to a
discovery response] is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.”). 
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (granting federal district courts jurisdiction of questions
arising under federal law); id. § 1332 (granting federal district courts jurisdiction over claims
between completely diverse parties when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000).
Although these are the most common predicates for federal jurisdiction, other grounds for
jurisdiction could potentially exist. 
38. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction,
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court is obliged to affirmatively look for a defect on its own and, if
the court finds one, dismiss the suit sua sponte.39 Third, unlike pro-
cedural defects, the court can never overlook a jurisdictional de-
fect, even if the plaintiff is blameless in the matter. Jurisdictional
laws, the saying goes, are “inflexible” and must be strictly applied.40
Fourth and finally, the court must dismiss the case without prej-
udice, thus allowing the plaintiff to refile the suit in a court with
jurisdiction.41
These defects, and the different judicial responses thereto, are
clear enough. What is far less clear is whether a particular defect is
substantive, procedural, or jurisdictional. Statutory provisions rare-
ly come with labels, and federal courts are thus left to discern, as
best as they can, whether the law that was violated was jurisdic-
tional. Sometimes the answer is easy: everyone knows that 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (the federal question statute) contains only jurisdic-
tional law.42 But sometimes the question is harder.
Consider the issue presented in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.43 In that
case, a plaintiff sued her former employer for workplace discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII (a federal statute) and won a $40,000
jury verdict.44 Soon after trial, however, the employer discovered
that, although Title VII prohibits employers from behaving as he
did, a separate section of the statute defines “employer” as a com-
because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.”). 
39. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter
delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.”).
40. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982) (“[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United
States is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny
its jurisdiction ... where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record.” (quo-
ting Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884))). 
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505
(2001) (“The primary meaning of ‘dismissal without prejudice,’ we think, is dismissal without
barring the plaintiff from returning later, to the same court [or in most cases, to] ... other
courts.”); S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713
F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A dismissal for lack of standing—or any other defect in subject
matter jurisdiction—must be one without prejudice, because a court that lacks jurisdiction
has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.”). 
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
43. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
44. Id. at 503-04.
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pany having “fifteen or more employees.”45 Because he had fewer
than fifteen employees, he argued that the lower court never had
jurisdiction over the suit and must vacate the judgment.46 Of course,
the employer at this point had to argue that the number of employ-
ees was a jurisdictional matter; if it pertained to the merits, he
would have forfeited this argument by not raising it earlier.47
So what is a court to do in this situation? That is, how should the
court determine whether Title VII’s employee-numerosity require-
ment defines the court’s jurisdiction or instead defines matters of
substance or procedure? It is to that matter that this Part now
turns.
B. The Current Approach
The Supreme Court’s current approach to jurisdictionality stems
from 2006. Before that time, the Court had been—by its own admis-
sion—“less than meticulous” in its use of the term “jurisdiction.”48
It had sometimes used the term to refer to “claim-processing rules”
(in other words, procedural rules), which are not “truly jurisdiction-
al.”49 Thus, the Court endeavored “to ‘bring some discipline’ to the
use of the term ‘jurisdictional.’”50
The discipline came in the form of “a ‘readily administrable bright
line’ for determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as
jurisdictional.”51 The “bright line” rule adopted at that time operates
as follows:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a
statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and
litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle
with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory
45. Id. at 503-04 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)).
46. Id. at 504.
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) (stating that most affirmative defenses not raised in a
responsive pleading are forfeited).
48. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511.
49. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
454-55 (2004)).
50. Id. (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011)).
51. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (quoting Arbaugh, 546
U.S. at 516)). 
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limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the
restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.52
The Court’s approach—often referred to as the “clear statement
rule”—has been widely praised.53 And perhaps with good reason, for
who doesn’t like clarity? Nonetheless, it is worth noting here an
oddity about the rule that this Article will return to later: although
the Court endeavored to discipline itself, it actually chose a rule that
disciplines Congress as well. And it is not at all clear that the Court
is entitled to discipline Congress in this way. As an interpreter of
statutes, the federal judiciary’s task is to discern the meaning of the
words chosen by Congress—not to affirmatively dictate to Congress
what its chosen words mean.54
The wisdom of the rule aside, the Court first applied its new
approach in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Title VII case mentioned
above in which the defendant argued that the court did not have
jurisdiction because he did not have “fifteen or more employees.”55
Applying its clear statement test, the Court first observed that
“Congress could make the employee-numerosity requirement ‘juris-
dictional,’ just as it has made an amount-in-controversy threshold
an ingredient of subject-matter jurisdiction ... under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332.”56 But tellingly, Congress did not declare the provision
jurisdictional. Rather, “the 15-employee threshold appears in a
[definitional section] that ‘does not speak in jurisdictional terms or
refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.’”57 Given
this, the Court concluded that the numerosity requirement “is an
element of a plaintiff ’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.”58
Since adopting the clear statement rule in 2006, the Court has
felt the need to soften it a bit. Thus, while the search for a clear
statement (if any) is still the centerpiece of the analysis, the Court
does not demand that Congress “incant magic words” to make its
52. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
53. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
54. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must
presume that [Congress] says in a statute what it means and means ... what it says.”).
55. 546 U.S. at 503 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)).
56. Id. at 514-15 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 515 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)). 
58. Id. at 516.
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jurisdictional preferences known.59 As the Court has explained,
“context, including th[e] Court’s interpretation of similar provisions
in many years past, is relevant.”60 Thus, when a “long line” of cases
“has treated a similar requirement as ‘jurisdictional,’” the Court pre-
sumes that “Congress intended to follow that course.”61
Bowles v. Russell illustrates this modified approach.62 Bowles
concerned a notice of appeal that the would-be appellant, Keith
Bowles, filed two days late.63 Bowles filed the notice late not because
he was asleep at the switch, but because the district court errone-
ously gave him the wrong deadline.64 Bowles thus sought, on eq-
uitable grounds, relief for the missed deadline.65 Such relief is
common in litigation generally,66 but not if a deadline is jurisdic-
tional. Jurisdictional requirements, as noted above, are strictly
applied.67 The question before the Court was thus whether the fil-
ing of a notice of appeal by the statutory deadline was jurisdic-
tional.68 The clear statement rule seemed to cut in Bowles’s favor,
because the statute specifying the appeal deadlines in his case did
not speak in jurisdictional terms.69 But that did not affect the result.
Rather, what mattered was that the “Court ha[d] long held that the
taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and
jurisdictional.’”70 Put differently, even though that Court adopted a
clear statement rule in Arbaugh, Bowles shows that the Court did
59. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013).
60. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2010).
61. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 436 (2011) (first quoting Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S.
67, 82 (2009); and then quoting John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130,
133-34, 139 (2008)); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34, 136
(2008) (treating a statute of limitations provision as jurisdictional in suits against the United
States, even though the provision did not use the word “jurisdiction”).
62. 551 U.S. 205 (2007).
63. Id. at 207.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 213-14.
66. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1) (permitting a federal court to grant a party relief from
judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”). 
67. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
68. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 206.
69. Id. at 208 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2006)). The federal statute worked in tandem
with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, see id. at 208-09, but Rule 4 did not
speak in jurisdictional terms either.
70. Id. at 209 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per
curiam)).
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mean to upset “long held” views that certain statutes are jurisdic-
tional— even if they lack the term jurisdiction.
Bowles makes sense—to a degree. If the Court has long held that
certain statutes are jurisdictional, it is fair to presume that Con-
gress has tacitly approved of those decisions by acquiescence.71
Thus, even statutes that are not jurisdictional by their language
alone could still be jurisdictional under the Arbaugh test because
congressional acquiescence—if long enough and consistent enough—
could amount to a type of congressional “clear statement.”72 Yet this
approach only works when Congress, having not spoken in jurisdic-
tional terms, acquiesces to the judicial use of the jurisdictional label.
A more problematic use of this approach—and one the Court has not
apparently contemplated—arises when Congress uses jurisdictional
terms to describe a rule that the courts have long held is not
jurisdictional. This might seem like an easy case; a court need only
follow Congress’s “clear statement.”73 As we shall see, however, the
matter is not that simple.
In sum, the jurisdictional label has significant consequences.
When a statute addresses subject matter jurisdiction, litigants can
invoke the statute at any time, the court must evaluate its jurisdic-
tion in the absence of a motion, apply the statute strictly, and
dismiss the suit without prejudice. To discern whether a statute
deserves the jurisdictional label, the Supreme Court has chosen a
“clear statement rule” that closely tracks the statutory language
while also allowing congressional acquiescence to precedent to
sometimes amount to a clear statement in favor of jurisdiction.74
With these matters explained, this Article now considers and
critiques two different ways to assess jurisdiction: the idealist and
positivist approaches.
71. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984). To be sure, the Court did
not take this approach with Bowles. Rather it ducked the implications of Arbaugh altogether.
The analysis here is simply an attempt to justify Bowles in light of Arbaugh.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
1426 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1413
II. IDEALISM OR POSITIVISM?
Whether a particular statute is jurisdictional depends on what
jurisdiction actually is. To jurisdictional idealists, jurisdiction
means one thing, while to jurisdictional positivists, it means
another. In this Part, I explain the idealist and positivist ap-
proaches and also explain why each approach is ultimately flawed.
The idealist approach, which holds that there is a fixed essence to
jurisdiction, is flawed because it denies Congress the constitutional
authority to control jurisdiction. A positivist approach, which holds
that jurisdiction is whatever Congress clearly states that it is, is
also flawed because it ignores the many different ways that Con-
gress uses the term “jurisdiction.”
A. Idealism and Its Flaws
Jurisdictional idealism, as this Article defines it, holds that there
is a Platonic ideal of jurisdiction. An idealist would determine a
law’s jurisdictionality by comparing it to jurisdiction’s Platonic
ideal. If the two are similar, the law is jurisdictional; if they are
different, the law is not jurisdictional. Left out of this analysis, of
course, is Congress. If Congress tried to declare a law jurisdictional
that did not fit within jurisdiction’s Platonic ideal, it would be
ineffectual, much in the way that calling a sheep’s tail a leg “would
not make it so.”75
Professor Scott Dodson recently expressed an idealist view in his
article, Jurisdiction and Its Effects.76 In Dodson’s view, a jurisdic-
tional law is a “boundar[y]” that “determines forum in a multiforum
legal system.”77 Thus, where a law operates as a boundary between
forums, it is jurisdictional; where it does not operate in that way, it
is not. To see Dodson’s conception in practice, consider Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., the employment discrimination case discussed above.78
In that case, the Court held that Title VII’s “fifteen or more employ-
ees” requirement was not jurisdictional because Congress did not
75. See Julian, supra note 6, at 242.
76. Dodson, supra note 5. 
77. Id. at 621.
78. 546 U.S. 500 (2006); see supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
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clearly state that it was.79 In Dodson’s view, the Court reached the
right result but for the wrong reason.80 Instead of considering what
Congress clearly stated, the Court should have considered whether
the employee-numerosity requirement operated as a boundary be-
tween federal courts and some other forum.81 Seeing nothing in the
employee-numerosity provision or related provisions that looked
boundary-ish, Dodson would declare the provision nonjurisdiction-
al.82
Casting jurisdiction as a system of boundaries is a useful frame-
work, but Dodson does not offer it only as a framework; he offers it
as a command.83 That is, he is not just arguing that the law of fed-
eral jurisdiction is best understood as a law of boundaries.84 Rather,
he is arguing that jurisdiction’s “inherent identity”85 is one of
boundaries—an identity that “[n]either Congress nor the courts can
change.”86 Expressing the point in the context of Arbaugh, Dodson
states that “it is not true, as the Supreme Court presumed, that
Congress could make Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement
jurisdictional simply by calling it so.”87
Dodson’s framework is a useful addition to the literature, but he
falters when he declares it binding on the courts and Congress. The
central flaw in jurisdictional idealism is that it overlooks Congress’s
long-standing power to define federal jurisdiction. Article I, Sec-
tion 8 grants Congress the power to create the lower federal courts,88
and, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the power to create these
courts carries with it the power to define their jurisdiction.89
79. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16.
80. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 654.
81. See id. (“[The Court in Arbaugh was] wrong to look to Congress to determine if a limit
[was] jurisdictional.”).
82. Id.
83. Cf. id. at 637.
84. Cf. id.
85. Cf. id. at 622.
86. Id. at 637.
87. Id. (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514-16 (2006)).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (authorizing Congress “[t]o constitute tribunals inferior
to the Supreme Court”). 
89. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973) (noting that Congress “was not
constitutionally required to create inferior Art. III courts,” or, even upon creating them,
“invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III”); Sheldon v.
Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Congress may withhold from any court of its creation
jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies.”).
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Congress must, of course, obey other constitutional dictates in
defining federal jurisdiction,90 but these dictates still leave Congress
extraordinary freedom in defining federal jurisdiction.
Take, for example, federal diversity jurisdiction. Article III,
Section 2 permits federal courts to adjudicate “[c]ontroversies ...
between Citizens of different states.”91 The first Congress instilled
the federal courts with jurisdiction over diverse parties, but impor-
tantly, also required the amount in controversy be greater than
$500.92 No one then or today doubts that the amount in controversy
requirement is jurisdictional, but Dodson’s approach seems to sug-
gest that it is not—not because Congress did not attempt to make
it jurisdictional, but that Congress could not have made it jurisdic-
tional.93 If Congress cannot make the number of employees in a Title
VII case jurisdictional, the argument goes, then Congress presum-
ably cannot make the number of dollars at stake jurisdictional
either.
Dodson might respond that the amount in controversy require-
ment acts as a “boundary” because cases that do not meet the
requirement are instead referred to state court for resolution. But
the same thing can be said of the employee-numerosity require-
ment.94 If that requirement is jurisdictional, then plaintiffs suing
90. Congress may not, for example, enact a jurisdictional statute that predicates juris-
diction on a plaintiff ’s race. Such a statute would violate the equal protection rights contained
in the Fifth Amendment. See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1034 (1982).
91. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
92. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (granting federal trial courts juris-
diction over diverse parties “where the matter in dispute exceeds ... the sum or value of five
hundred dollars”).
93. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 637.
94. Dodson seems to recognize this possibility, but thinks that a boundary between state
and federal courts could only be created if Congress “created a cause of action against
employers who did not meet the employee-numerosity requirement but required that such a
claim be lodged exclusively in state court.” Id. at 637 n.107. However, this argument misper-
ceives the vesting of state court jurisdiction. State courts ordinarily receive their jurisdiction
from state legislatures (not Congress) and in nearly every instance are open to federal claims.
See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734-35 (2009). Moreover, it is widely accepted that state
courts have jurisdiction over diversity claims in which less than $75,000 is in controversy,
even through Congress has not affirmatively lodged such claims “exclusively in state court.”
Dodson, supra note 5, at 637 n.107. The same could also be said of federal question
jurisdiction when an amount in controversy requirement still attached to it. See Judiciary Act
of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (authorizing federal district courts to take jurisdiction over
claims arising under federal law and when at least $500 was at stake); Federal Question
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employers with fewer than fifteen employees can simply take their
cases to state courts. Put differently, just as Congress can decide
that low-value diversity claims belong in state courts, it can also
decide that low-employee Title VII claims belong in state courts as
well. The core problem with Dodson’s claim, therefore, is not neces-
sarily that he has incorrectly defined jurisdiction as a “boundary,”
but that he fails to acknowledge that Congress has a wide-ranging
power to draw boundaries.
An additional way to understand this point is to consider what a
federal court would do if Congress explicitly declared the employee-
numerosity requirement jurisdictional. That is, suppose that Con-
gress, dissatisfied with the result in Arbaugh, amended Title VII to
state that “federal district courts shall only have jurisdiction to
consider claims under this Act if the employer accused of violating
the Act has fifteen or more employees.” If a court were to adopt
Dodson’s view, and find the numerosity requirement nonjuris-
dictional, how would it explain its holding? The court could not say
that the statute is unconstitutional for, as noted above, the Consti-
tution plainly does not prohibit such statutes.95 Nor could the court
declare that, as a matter of federal common law, the statute falters.
Federal common law is subject to modification by Congress.96 The
only way to explain its decision would be to hold that, as a matter
of natural law, such definitions of jurisdiction are impermissible.
This is not the place to enter the debate between positivism and
natural law, but it is enough to state here that, to the limited extent
that natural law may have a role in our nation’s largely positivist
approach to law, the role is confined to circumstances in which
widely held moral convictions are implicated. In the realm of subject
matter jurisdiction, there are no such widely held moral convictions
(excepting, perhaps, those held by the occasional, out-of-touch law
professor).
Thus, the chief problem with idealism is its incompatibility with
our fundamentally positivist system—a system that gives Congress
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, Sec. 2(b), 94 Stat. 2369 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)) (abolishing the amount in controversy requirement).
95. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
96. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1981) (“We have always
recognized that federal common law is ‘subject to the paramount authority of Congress.’”
(quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931))).
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near plenary control over federal jurisdiction. Dodson might none-
theless counter that his approach still reserves a role for Congress.
Though unable to define jurisdiction on its own, Congress, according
to Dodson, can “exert some control over the effects of a particular
jurisdictional law.”97 Referring to Bowles,98 the notice of appeal case
discussed above,99 Dodson explains that, even if Congress is stuck
with the jurisdictional label there, it could nonetheless “make the
deadline to file a notice of appeal, or even the notice of appeal itself,
subject to the principles of equity.”100 I agree that Congress could do
this, just as it could also make jurisdictional laws subject to waiver
or forfeiture, not subject to sua sponte inquiry, or impose any other
effect commonly attached to jurisdictional laws.101
Dodson’s allowance for congressional control over jurisdictional
effects addresses idealism’s incompatibility with congressional pow-
er, but in the process, it creates a new problem: it renders juris-
diction functionally irrelevant. Take for instance the common rule
that jurisdictional objections can never be forfeited.102 Dodson
believes that Congress is free to change this; in other words, that it
is free to make jurisdictional objections forfeitable if not raised at
a particular time or in a particular way.103 He is undoubtedly
correct, but Congress’s power in this regard extends far beyond the
realm of jurisdiction. If Congress decided to, for example, it could
allow defendants to raise statute of limitations defenses for the first
time on appeal.104 But if Congress can apply a jurisdictional effect
to a nonjurisdictional rule, what is the point of forbidding Congress
from declaring something jurisdictional? Congress can get exactly
what it wants simply by speaking in terms of effects, as long as it
omits the magic word “jurisdictional.”
The upshot of such an approach is that the law of jurisdiction will
be replaced with the law of effects. There is nothing necessarily
97. Dodson, supra note 5, at 637 (emphasis added).
98. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
100. Dodson, supra note 5, at 637; see also id. at 637 n.109, 639.
101. Dodson appears to hold this view as well. See id. at 637.
102. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction,
because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.”).
103. See Dodson, supra note 5, at 638.
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) (specifying which defenses will be waived if not raised in a
responsive pleading). 
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wrong with that as a normative matter (some scholars believe that
is the proper course),105 but it is contrary to Dodson’s overall ar-
gument—that the Court’s current positivist stance is “incoherent”
because it “renders [jurisdiction] irrelevant except as a proxy for a
defined set of effects.”106 Put differently, although Dodson’s position
will prevent Congress from redefining jurisdiction,107 it will do noth-
ing to prevent Congress from making jurisdiction irrelevant.
In sum, the idealist position advanced by Professor Dodson fails
to account for Congress’s dominant role in defining federal subject
matter jurisdiction without also rendering the concept of jurisdic-
tion irrelevant. Idealist insights ought not to be jettisoned entirely,
however, as illustrated by the discussion in Part III.A. For now, this
Article turns to an assessment of jurisdictional positivism.
B. Positivism and Its Flaws
Unlike idealists, jurisdictional positivists eschew any “essential
concept of jurisdiction”108 and instead believe that jurisdiction is
“whatever the legislature says it is.”109 The biggest star in the pos-
itivist universe is, at present, the Supreme Court. As noted above,
the Supreme Court adheres to a “clear statement” approach that
works as follows:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a
statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and
litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle
with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory
limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the
restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.110
Since adopting the clear statement rule in 2006, the Court has
backed off of it a bit. In particular, it considers “context, including
th[e] Court’s interpretation of similar provisions in many years
105. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 15, at 1614. 
106. Dodson, supra note 5, at 631. 
107. See id. at 622.
108. Lee, supra note 15, at 1631. 
109. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 20-21.
110. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
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past.”111 Thus, when Congress has left undisturbed a “long line” of
cases treating a particular “requirement as ‘jurisdictional,’” the
Court “presume[s] that Congress intended to follow that course.”112
Given the discussion above describing Congress’s broad powers
over federal jurisdiction, it would seem hard to challenge jurisdic-
tional positivism.113 If Congress clearly states that a particular
requirement is jurisdictional, and the declaration is constitutional,
on what ground could the Court ever ignore Congress’s declaration?
The problem with the Court’s approach arises from Congress’s
varied use of the term “jurisdiction.” A search of Westlaw turns up
7022 instances in which Congress has used the word “jurisdic-
tion.”114 Some statutes predicate the district courts’ “jurisdiction” on
whether a case “aris[es] under”115 or is “brought under”116 a parti-
cular statute, while other statutes predicate jurisdiction on whether
the plaintiff is seeking an “injunction”117 or instead seeking “appro-
priate relief.”118 Still others appear to make jurisdiction contingent
upon whether a claim is “founded upon” certain types of contracts,119
or whether a plaintiff is seeking relief for an injury “caused by a
vessel on navigable waters.”120 And yet other statutes use “jurisdic-
tion” to refer to a political unit (for example, “State or other local
jurisdiction”121) or judicial power over a party (for example, “jurisdic-
tion over such person”122). It is a curious rule that declares that
seven thousand usages of the same word, spread out over hundreds
of years, all undoubtedly mean the same thing.
111. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2010).
112. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 436 (2011) (first quoting Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S.
67, 82 (2009); and then quoting John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130,
133-34, 139 (2008)).
113. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
114. Data on file with author.
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 3207(a)(1) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 2440 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012); 30
U.S.C. § 1467 (2012). 
116. See 7 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 3612; 18 U.S.C. § 2338 (2012); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9124(a) (2012).
117. See 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 47 U.S.C. § 36 (2012). 
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 3207(a)(2); 16 U.S.C. § 2633(b); 29 U.S.C. § 1855(b); 42 U.S.C.
§ 5405(a)(3).
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).
120. See 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2012).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 3941.
122. 39 U.S.C. § 3016(b)(2) (2012).
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For an example of Congress using the word “jurisdiction” in a
nonjurisdictional sense, consider the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986.123 Section 11046(a) of the
statute requires companies handling hazardous chemicals to inform
the government of their activities so persons interacting with the
companies may gauge their risk of harm.124 In 1995, a group known
as Citizens for a Better Environment learned that Steel Company,
which was subject to the Act, had failed to submit its inventory
forms for the past several years.125 Realizing its mistake, Steel
Company quickly filed the necessary forms.126 Nonetheless, Citizens
for a Better Environment brought suit, alleging that the company’s
prior failure to submit the forms constituted a violation of
§ 11046(a).127 Steel Company disagreed, arguing that, now that it
had filed the appropriate forms, there was no violation upon which
it could be sued.128
The issue for the Supreme Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment was whether § 11046(a)—which the Court
referred to as “subsection (a)”—permitted suits for prior, as opposed
to ongoing, violations of the Act.129 This would seem like a merits is-
sue, but it actually came up in the context of subject matter jur-
isdiction because of the content of subsection (c), which stated: “The
district court shall have jurisdiction in actions brought under sub-
section (a) ... to enforce [the Act] and to impose any civil penalty
provided for [in the Act].”130
Subsection (c) quite plainly uses the word “jurisdiction,” and it
plainly authorizes district courts to take jurisdiction over suits
“brought under subsection (a).”131 Thus, if the clear statement rule
is to be taken seriously, a court’s jurisdiction will depend on an
interpretation of subsection (a). If a suit is brought within the terms
of subsection (a), the court has jurisdiction; if a suit is not brought
123. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11001
(2012)).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A) (2012).
125. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1998).
126. Id. at 88.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 86, 90.
130. Id. at 90 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c) (1994)).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c) (2012).
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within the terms of subsection (a), the court has no jurisdiction. To
determine its jurisdiction, therefore, a court must determine what
subsection (a) requires.132
Though the clear statement rule suggests that subsection (a) is
jurisdictional, a more nuanced analysis would suggest otherwise.
Subsection (a), by all accounts, imposes substantive obligations on
companies.133 To wit, the provision requires companies to report cer-
tain chemicals in certain circumstances, but allows them not to
report other chemicals in other circumstances.134 Thus, if subsection
(a) is jurisdictional, two odd consequences would follow. First, fed-
eral courts would be required to conduct a sua sponte inquiry into
the merits of the case, a task fundamentally at odds with the adver-
sarial model of American litigation.135 Second, if federal courts found
the plaintiff ’s case to fail on the merits, it would be required to dis-
miss the suit for lack of jurisdiction—which, because it would be a
dismissal without prejudice, would allow the plaintiff to refile in
state court without any fear of res judicata.136 Thus, if subsection (a)
is treated as jurisdictional, plaintiffs will get two bites at the apple,
one in state court and one in federal court. This makes little sense
and is good reason to conclude that Congress did not intend to make
subsection (a) jurisdictional.
Indeed, this is exactly what the Supreme Court did—though not
in so many words. Writing for the Court before adopting the clear
statement rule in 2006, Justice Scalia explained that “[i]t is un-
reasonable to read [subsection (c)] as making all the elements of the
cause of action under subsection (a) jurisdictional, rather than as
merely specifying the remedial powers of the court, viz., to enforce
132. Justice John Paul Stevens made this exact point in an opinion concurring in the
judgment. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 113 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]f [sub-
section (a)] authorizes citizen suits for wholly past violations, the district court has juris-
diction over these actions; if it does not, the court lacks jurisdiction.”).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a).
134. See id.
135. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); see also supra note 39
and accompanying text. 
136. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-03 (2001). Some
might argue that this conclusion contradicts Bell v. Hood, in which the Court observed that
when a defect affects both jurisdiction and merits, “dismissal of the case would be on the
merits, not for want of jurisdiction.” 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (citing Binderup v. Pathe Exch.,
Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 305-08 (1923); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 493-94 (1902)). Bell,
however, involved an interpretation of the federal question statute. See id. at 684-85. 
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the [Act] and to impose civil penalties.”137 Addressing the import of
the word jurisdiction in subsection (c), Justice Scalia continued:
“‘[j]urisdiction,’ it has been observed, ‘is a word of many, too many,
meanings,’ and it is commonplace for the term to be used as it
evidently was here,” in other words, to designate a remedy.138 Thus,
prior to the Court’s adoption of the clear statement rule in 2006, the
Court was well aware that Congress often used the word jurisdiction
to address matters that it did not intend to make jurisdictional.139
By adopting the clear statement rule in 2006, however, the Court
abruptly, and without explanation, cast off this prior observation.140
Defenders of positivism and the clear statement rule might none-
theless push back against this argument in two ways. First, de-
fenders might argue that this attack on the clear statement rule is
really just an attack on textualism as a form of statutory interpreta-
tion. Textualism, of course, will sometimes yield odd results, but the
interpretive method is hardly proven deficient by these results
alone.141 One must also consider the benefits of such an approach—
something that this Section has not done. This pushback would
have some traction if this Section staked out an antitextualist
position. But it has not.
Textualism focuses on the semantic meaning of statutory text,
but it has never dismissed context as a tool for discerning that
semantic meaning.142 When a word is subject to multiple meanings,
textualism does not advocate picking the most common meaning
and applying that meaning to all uses of the word. Rather, textual-
ism accepts that context may be used to help discern the meaning
of a word.143 As Justice Scalia illustrated the idea, “If you tell me, ‘I
took the boat out on the bay,’ I understand ‘bay’ to mean one thing;
if you tell me, ‘I put the saddle on the bay,’ I understand it to mean
137. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90.
138. Id. (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
139. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006).
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 70, 93-94, 94 nn.90-91 (2006).
142. See id. at 79-80, 80 n.34.
143. Id. at 79 (“In contrast with their ancestors in the ‘plain meaning’ school of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modern textualists do not believe that it is possible
to infer meaning from ‘within the four corners’ of a statute. Rather, they assert that language
is intelligible only by virtue of a community’s shared conventions for understanding words in
context.” (footnotes omitted)).
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something else.”144 Thus, the criticisms of the clear statement rule
made here should resonate with textualists and purposvists alike.
The criticisms are simply based on the observation that the context
in which Congress uses the word “jurisdiction” contains useful infor-
mation about Congress’s purpose in using that term.
A second response to these criticisms of the clear statement rule
might be that it throws the baby out with the bathwater. That is,
one need not jettison the entire rule simply to solve the problems
that it might create in cases like Steel Co.145 Just as the Court
looked beyond the clear text in Bowles (in which a statute was held
jurisdictional even though the statute did not contain the word
“jurisdiction”),146 the argument goes, the Court could also look be-
yond the clear text in cases like Steel Co. (in which a statute that
contains the word “jurisdiction” could be held nonjurisdictional).147
The problem with this argument, however, is that it effectively
guts the positivist’s clear statement rule. If the absence of the word
“jurisdiction” does not make something nonjurisdictional (as in
Bowles),148 and the presence of the word “jurisdiction” does not
make something jurisdictional (as in Steel Co.),149 what is the point
of the clear statement rule? It is better to abandon the rule alto-
gether—or, as we shall see next, reform it.
In sum, neither idealism nor positivism will lead to normatively
desirable jurisdictional decisions. Idealism inappropriately dimin-
ishes Congress’s prerogative to control jurisdiction, and positivism
inappropriately diminishes commonsense interpretive tools that
could be useful in discerning jurisdiction. What is needed is an
approach to jurisdiction that lies somewhere in between—an ap-
proach that is both idealist and positivist.
144. SCALIA, supra note 27, at 26; see also id. at 144 (acknowledging that the “semantic
intention” of a legislature, in that, what the legislature thought a particular word meant when
it used the word, is a proper inquiry for text-based forms of interpretation).
145. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 86 (1998).
146. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 208-10 (2007).
147. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90.
148. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 208-10.
149. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90.
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III. IDEALISM AND POSITIVISM
As with many either/or dilemmas, the best answer to the ideal-
ist/positivist dilemma is ... both. By combining the two approaches
into one, the benefits of both can be harnessed without giving effect
to any of their flaws. Section A below explains and defends the
idealist-positivist approach, and Section B applies it to an issue
currently splitting the circuit courts.
A. The Approach Explained
The best way to determine whether a particular statutory pro-
vision is jurisdictional is to evaluate Congress’s chosen words (a
positivist approach) in light of the traditional characteristics of
jurisdiction (an idealist approach). This combined approach makes
use of positivism’s strong suit, namely its recognition that Congress
has the prerogative to specify federal jurisdiction, as well as ideal-
ism’s strong suit, namely its willingness to give weight to jurisdic-
tion’s traditional characteristics. At the same time, the combined
approach also keeps in check the flaws of each individual approach.
When idealism would tie Congress’s hands in defining jurisdiction,
positivism makes sure to give effect to congressional choices.
Similarly, when the clear statement rule places dispositive weight
on the word “jurisdiction,” idealism requires courts to look more
broadly at context to determine if jurisdiction makes any sense.
Part II.B, above, in its critique of the positivist approach, pro-
vided a partial illustration of this approach.150 That Section used a
statute containing the word “jurisdiction” to argue that Congress did
not likely intend to make the statute jurisdictional and that, as a
result, the clear statement rule would lead to incorrect results.151 To
show that Congress did not likely intend to make the rule jurisdic-
tional, Part II.B invoked two common characteristics of subject
matter jurisdiction, namely (1) the court’s obligation to conduct a
sua sponte inquiry into the existence of jurisdiction,152 and (2) the
150. See supra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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obligation to dismiss suits lacking jurisdiction without prejudice.153
If the statute there was treated as jurisdictional, it would have led
to the extraordinarily odd circumstance of a court conducting its
own sua sponte investigation of the merits of a lawsuit and, if the
merits were deficient, allowing the plaintiff to retry the entire case
in state court.154 A far better interpretation of the statute, which is
what the Court chose in the end, treated the word “jurisdiction” as
an effort to “specify[ ] the remedial powers of the court.”155
This illustration, however, gives rise to a conundrum: What is
Congress to do if it sincerely desires an unorthodox jurisdictional
result? The combined approach would seem to put this option nearly
off limits because every unorthodox attempt to make something
jurisdictional would likely be reinterpreted to render it an orthodox
jurisdictional rule. For this reason, the combined approach should
contain a type of clear statement rule, but importantly, not a rule
that operated like the one just criticized in Part II.B.
The clear statement rule proposed here would not hinge on the
mere use of the word “jurisdiction.” After all, because “[j]urisdiction
... is a word of many, too many, meanings,”156 the word itself will
often fail to evince Congress’s jurisdictional desires. A better clear
statement rule would—in cases in which jurisdiction would be un-
orthodox—look for various “jurisdictional indicators.” Consider, for
example, the statute at issue in Steel Co.: “The district court shall
have jurisdiction in actions brought under subsection (a) ... to
enforce the [Act] and to impose any civil penalty provided for [in the
Act].”157
As explained above, this provision should not be interpreted as
jurisdictional because it would be quite odd for Congress to require
courts to make a sua sponte inquiry into the merits of a claim and,
if the merits were found lacking, to dismiss the suit without
prejudice.158 If, however, Congress truly desired that the statute be
jurisdictional, it could address these factors by rewriting the statute
as follows:
153. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
155. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).
156. Id. (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
157. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c) (1994)).
158. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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(c) The district court shall have subject matter jurisdiction in
actions brought under subsection (a) only if the court deter-
mines, on its own inquiry or upon the presentation of any
party, that each and every element of subsection (a) is satisfied.
If the court finds an element of subsection (a) unproven, it shall
dismiss the suit without prejudice.
This rewritten statute better communicates Congress’s jurisdic-
tional desires (to the extent it might have any). To be clear, this
version of the clear statement rule does not require Congress to
always speak with such clarity; it only requires Congress to do so
when it wishes to make unorthodox jurisdictional choices.
There are two criticisms one might lodge against this reformed
version of the clear statement rule. First, one might argue that
requiring extra indicators of jurisdiction reeks of irony. Earlier, this
Article argued that the clear statement rule is unworkable.159 But
now it is arguing that that rule should be replaced with, in effect,
the really clear clear statement rule. But the irony here is not nearly
as rich as it might seem. Because “[j]urisdiction ... is a word of
many, too many, meanings,” a rule that focuses on the word juris-
diction alone was hardly designed to promote clarity.160 Thus, the
rule proposed here is not an ironic replacement for the Court’s clear
statement rule, but rather, it is the first clear statement rule that
actually promotes clarity.
Second, one might argue that requiring Congress to add extra
“jurisdictional indicators” for unorthodox jurisdictional choices may,
over time, create a new baseline against which the Court will mea-
sure jurisdiction. For example, one could imagine litigants contest-
ing the jurisdictionality of a plainly jurisdictional statute like 28
U.S.C. § 1331 by arguing that it contains no extra “jurisdictional
indicators”—indicators that Congress knows how to use if it wants
to.161 This criticism falters for two reasons. First, a court’s search for
extra indicators of jurisdiction should be limited to those cases in
which jurisdiction would be unorthodox. These situations, by defi-
nition, will be uncommon. Second, inasmuch as a new baseline
159. See supra Part II.B.
160. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90 (quoting Vanness, 85 F.3d at 663 n.2).
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
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develops, it will be the natural—and preferable—result of ac-
knowledging that the word “jurisdiction,” on its own, retains ambi-
guity. When a word is susceptible to many meanings, all who en-
counter the word will necessarily look for extra information
indicating which meaning the speaker has attached to the word.162
To the extent these many meanings persist, people will frequently
search for indicators of meaning—so frequently that a new baseline
for discerning meaning will develop. Thus, in the unlikely circum-
stance that a new baseline develops with regard to jurisdictional
statements, it will likely be because a new baseline was neces-
sary.163
With the hope that the combined approach has been adequately
explained and defended, the Article now illustrates the approach.
B. The Approach Applied
As explained in Section A of this Part, the best way to measure
the jurisdictionality of a statute is to evaluate Congress’s chosen
words (a positivist approach) in light of the traditional character-
istics of jurisdiction (an idealist approach). This Section applies that
approach to a circuit split involving the jurisdictionality of the “fi-
nal agency action” requirement164 in the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).165
162. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
163. There is one other challenge that might be lodged against the version of the clear
statement rule proposed here, which Professors Hawley and Hessick have separately leveled
at the Court’s current iteration of the clear statement rule. See Hawley, supra note 21, at
2064-70; Hessick, supra note 21, at 926-29. Both Hawley and Hessick criticize the Court’s
clear statement rule because courts do not invoke it to further an underlying constitutional
value—which is a generally accepted purpose of such rules. Although that may be a valid crit-
icism of the Court’s clear statement rule, it is not a valid criticism of the clear statement rule
proposed here. The rule proposed here is designed to address the ambiguity flowing from the
many different uses of the word “jurisdiction.” An interpretive approach that does not give
talismanic weight to a single word but looks instead for other indicators of statutory meaning
hardly needs a constitutional value underlying it to make it worthwhile. 
164. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
165. In the spring of 2017, after this Article was in the process of publication, the Supreme
Court decided a case that could also be used to illustrate the approach advocated here.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. involved
a foreign government’s claim to sovereign immunity in federal court. 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1317
(2017). Such immunity, however, falls away when the suit involves “property taken in
violation of international law.” Id. at 1316 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012)). The
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To understand the split, it is first necessary to understand the
APA and its potential intersection with federal jurisdiction. The
APA does many things but chief among them is waive the federal
government’s sovereign immunity.166 The federal government, like
state governments, is immune from suit unless it consents to suit by
waiving its immunity.167 Importantly, sovereign immunity is juris-
dictional—meaning that when a sovereign is immune, the federal
court must dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, not on the mer-
its.168 Although courts have long considered sovereign immunity
jurisdictional, it is telling that statutes addressing immunity (in
other words, statutes that enable federal jurisdiction) do not always
contain the word “jurisdiction.” Instead, these statutory waivers
often simply contain an authorization to bring suit.169
Given sovereign immunity’s jurisdictional nature, but the usual
absence of the word “jurisdiction” in statutory waivers, one can
question for the Court was whether a plaintiff could overcome a foreign government’s sov-
ereign immunity by merely pleading that her “property [was] taken in violation of inter-
national law,” or must the plaintiff instead prove that her “property [was] taken in violation
of international law.” Id. The Court held that the plaintiff must prove the violation, a conclu-
sion that is correct under the approach advocated above. Id. at 1324; see supra Part III.A. The
statute spoke in explicit jurisdictional terms, see 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3) (“A foreign state shall
not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case
... in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue.”), and the
use of jurisdiction in this context was entirely consistent with traditional understandings of
jurisdiction. For better or worse, courts have long considered sovereign immunity
jurisdictional. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is juris-
dictional in nature.”). Finally, the common rule that a good faith allegation is sufficient to
establish jurisdiction was not appropriate because that rule is applied in suits in which juris-
diction is based on allegations “arising under” or “brought” under a particular law. See Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946); John F. Preis, How the Federal Cause of Action Relates
to Rights, Remedies, and Jurisdiction, 67 FLA. L. REV. 849, 889-90 (2015). The statute in this
case contained no such language. 
166. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
167. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
168. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475 (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.”). 
169. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (holding that “insofar as
Title II [of the Americans with Disabilities Act] creates a private cause of action for damages
against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity”); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (dismissing the suit because a congressionally created cause of action
did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity); Emps. of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare
of Mo. v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973) (holding that a
cause of action to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act did not validly abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity).
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already see the trouble with a clear statement rule. Under its
original iteration, the Court’s clear statement rule would declare
these waivers nonjurisdictional because they do not contain a clear
statement of jurisdictionality.170 This, however, would upset long-
standing precedent.171 Seeing problems like this, the Court (as we
have seen) reformed its clear statement rule somewhat in Bowles v.
Russell.172 There, the Court limited the effect of Arbaugh (albeit
without specifically acknowledging problems created by Arbaugh)
by declaring where a “long line” of cases “has treated a similar
requirement as ‘jurisdictional,’” a court should continue to treat the
statute as jurisdictional.173 Bowles was a step in the right direction,
but it falls short of solving the problem. For example, what should
a court do when there is no “long line of cases”174 pointing it in the
right direction—such as where there is a split among the circuits?
This dilemma brings us to the circuit split over the APA’s final
agency action requirement. The requirement is contained in 5
U.S.C. § 704: “Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court
are subject to judicial review.”175 The purpose of the requirement is
to ensure that the federal courts do not evaluate agency action until
the agency has completed its decision-making process—in other
words, until it has reached a “final” decision.176 The statute is clear
on its face that suits challenging nonfinal agency action may not
proceed, but what is not clear is whether such suits should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or dismissed on the merits. At
170. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
171. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986) (“When the United States consents
to be sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the court’s
jurisdiction.”).
172. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text. 
173. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 436 (2011) (first quoting Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S.
67, 82 (2009); and then quoting John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130,
133-34, 139 (2008)).
174. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436.
175. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
176. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. FERC, 341 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting
that judicial review should be “limited to final orders to ensure there will be no interference
with the administrative process” (citing The Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 F.2d 1382, 1387-88
(9th Cir. 1985))).
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present, five circuits treat the requirement as jurisdictional177 and
five do not.178 Under the Supreme Court’s current approach, the re-
quirement would be classified as nonjurisdictional because (1) Con-
gress did not clearly state that the provision was jurisdictional and
(2) there does not exist a “long line” of cases “treat[ing] a similar
requirement as ‘jurisdictional.’”179
A much better analysis would look at the text in light of common
understandings of jurisdiction. The first thing one notices about the
text is that, even though § 704 does not contain the word juris-
diction, it arguably operates as an authorization for suit by stating
that final agency action is “subject to judicial review.”180 Waivers of
sovereign immunity, as noted above, often take the form of author-
izations to bring suit and, because sovereign immunity is jurisdic-
tional, such authorizations would have jurisdictional implications
as well.181
However, this is not the only permissible interpretation. Two
arguments could be mounted to the contrary. First, a nearby pro-
vision, 5 U.S.C. § 702, also seems to contain an authorization to sue.
Indeed, the text of § 702 might be a better candidate for a statutory
waiver: “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action ...
is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the
United States seeking relief other than money damages ... shall
not be dismissed ... on the ground that it is against the United
States.”182
This section not only appears to authorize suit, it also contains
uncommon but revealing language addressing sovereign immunity.
177. See Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2014);
Belle Co., L.L.C. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2014); Fairbanks
N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2008); Home
Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 335 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 2003);
Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003).
178. Jama v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 760 F.3d 490, 494 n.4 (6th Cir. 2014); Iowa League
of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 863 n.12 (8th Cir. 2013); Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 666
F.3d 118, 125 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012); Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 33 (1st Cir. 2007);
Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
179. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436 (first quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009); and then quoting John
R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34, 139 (2008)).
180. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
181. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
182. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
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The second sentence of that provision, by stating that a suit “shall
not be dismissed ... on the ground that it is against the United
States” is the best candidate yet for evidence of statutory waiver.183
This language is in a different section than the “final agency action”
requirement—which would suggest that the requirement is not
jurisdictional. But focusing on how the provisions are in different
statutory sections may be misguided. For one, both sections—
because they both focus on “agency action”—may be interlocking.184
For another, in the field of sovereign immunity, criteria far removed
from the statutory waiver can be deemed part of the waiver itself,
and thus jurisdictional.185 Thus, this counterargument, though
reasonable, is not so strong as to carry the day.
A second counterargument would involve the jurisdictional
holding in Califano v. Sanders.186 Califano answered the question
of whether the APA (of which § 702 and § 704 are a part) “is an
independent grant to district courts of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.”187 The Court held that those provisions were not independent
grants of jurisdiction and that the federal question statute—28
U.S.C. § 1331—served as the jurisdictional grant for review of
agency actions.188 On its face, Califano would seem to easily resolve
the circuit split on whether final agency action is jurisdictional.
Given that the APA is not an independent grant of jurisdiction, then
the final agency action requirement in § 704 obviously cannot be
jurisdictional.189 This analysis is a bit too facile, however. To say
that § 1331, not the APA, provides a grant of subject matter
jurisdiction is not to say that the APA cannot claw back or otherwise
impact jurisdiction.190 The APA clearly attempts to waive sovereign
183. Id.
184. See id. §§ 702, 704.
185. For example, in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008), the
Supreme Court held that the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of limitations for suits against the
United States (located at 28 U.S.C. § 1491) was jurisdictional, even though the waiver of
sovereign immunity which permitted those suits (and which was jurisdictional) was located
at 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
186. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
187. Id. at 100-01.
188. See id. at 106.
189. Indeed, this is the approach the D.C. Circuit has taken in resolving this issue. See
Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (relying on Califano).
190. For instance, § 1331 is not the exclusive means of conveying subject matter
jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (conveying subject matter jurisdiction in
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immunity and sovereign immunity is, as noted above, jurisdic-
tional.191 It is possible to conclude that, although § 1331 authorizes
district courts to take jurisdiction, it does not accomplish the sep-
arate and essential jurisdictional task of waiving sovereign im-
munity. Indeed, even if the Court concluded that the APA does not
touch on jurisdiction in any way, it would have to walk back its
many other statements that a statutory authorization to sue a gov-
ernment accomplishes a waiver or abrogation of sovereign
immunity—and thus has jurisdictional implications.192 This count-
erargument, like the one before it, is not so strong that it wins the
day.
Given these inconclusive arguments concerning the text of the
APA, a further exploration of traditional characteristics of juris-
diction can help considerably. One characteristic that would appear
especially relevant here is that jurisdictional dismissals are dis-
missals without prejudice.193 Given this, the question becomes
whether a plaintiff who brings suit before an agency has reached its
final decision should be able to come back when the decision is final,
or should be forever barred from suit. If one believes that Congress
wanted the plaintiff to have a chance to return, that would militate
in favor of jurisdictionality.
On this issue, there are two reasons to think that a nonprejudicial
dismissal, and thus a jurisdictional label, makes sense. First, when
a suit is filed prior to final agency action, the suit is in a similar
posture to an unripe suit. The ripeness requirement, like the final
agency action requirement, ensures that the suit is fit for judicial
review and relief.194 Importantly, ripeness is jurisdictional; it allows
plaintiffs to return to court once their suit is fit for resolution.195
Second, a suit filed prior to final agency action also mimics a suit
filed before exhaustion of administrative remedies. The exhaustion
of such remedies is not always jurisdictional,196 but importantly, the
Supreme Court has held it jurisdictional in tort suits filed against
diversity suits).
191. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012); see also supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
194. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57-58 (1993).
195. See id.
196. Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (finding exhaustion
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act to be nonjurisdictional).
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the federal government—suits that also predicate a waiver of sover-
eign immunity on whether a demand for relief has been “‘finally
denied’ by th[e] agency.”197 In light of these two considerations, a
jurisdictional characterization would seem appropriate.
Another common characteristic of subject matter jurisdiction—its
strict application—also seems to point toward a jurisdictional label
here.198 The strict application prevents federal courts from expand-
ing their power by loosely interpreting and applying jurisdictional
rules.199 A strict application of the final agency action requirement
makes sense because it prevents courts from invading the province
of a coordinate branch. Were courts able to develop equitable excep-
tions to the final agency action requirement (as they routinely do
with nonjurisdictional rules),200 agencies would be subject to judicial
review while in the midst trying to render their own decisions.
In light of these common jurisdictional characteristics—nonjur-
isdictional dismissals and strict application of jurisdictional rules—
a jurisdictional label is likely appropriate. This conclusion, though
contrary to the dictates of the Court’s current clear statement rule,
is sensible because it recognizes that “jurisdiction” is more than a
word in a vacuum. It is a word used in the context of widely recog-
nized jurisdictional characteristics and the statute’s connection with
sovereign immunity.
CONCLUSION
Congress controls federal jurisdiction but, because it does not
have to live with the ambiguity its statutes create, may be less than
precise in its use of the term “jurisdiction.” Scholars and the Su-
preme Court are understandably interested in sorting out the prob-
lems that arise from congressional imprecision, but the proper
solution here is not to search for an ideal form of jurisdiction or
adopt magic-word requirements. Idealist jurisdiction would deny
Congress its constitutional authority, and a positivist magic-word
approach would ignore the way Congress actually uses the word
“jurisdiction.” Instead, the solution is to listen to Congress. Like all
197. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1993).
198. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
199. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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speakers, Congress speaks in a particular context, and context is an
essential piece of all interpretive regimes. The context that is par-
ticularly relevant here consists of the commonly accepted character-
istics of jurisdiction, and by keeping these in mind, courts are far
more likely to reach the appropriate jurisdictional result.
